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U.N. TRUCE BRINGS UNCERTAIN PEACE TO INDONESIA

ALTHOUGH frequently ignored in the news, the current situation in Indonesia is an important test of the United Nations and of American policy toward colonial peoples. About a month ago—on January 17—representatives of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia signed a truce agreement ending the state of hostilities that had existed since Dutch forces launched military operations last July. Today the two parties are attempting to work out the terms of a political understanding necessary to implement the truce. The results will help to shape the future both of Indonesia, a rich country of 70,000,000 people with a powerful nationalist movement, and the Netherlands, whose prosperity and position have rested in large measure on colonial control of Indonesia.

ABOARD THE U.S.S. RENVILLE. United Nations responsibility arises from the fact that the truce was arranged by a Committee of Good Offices dispatched to Indonesia last year by the UN Security Council. American responsibility is less direct, but no less real, for the United States undoubtedly played the key role among the powers in determining the policy of the UN. Symbolic of this American position is the probable designation of the January 17 accord as the Renville truce—after the American naval vessel on which the mediation meetings were held and the agreement signed in Batavia harbor.

The terms of the Renville truce add up to a substantial victory for the Netherlands, reflecting in part the military defeats suffered by the Indonesian Republic and the Republicans' lack of effective outside support as compared with the Dutch. On the other hand, although the truce in effect recognizes Dutch seizures of territory in last summer's campaign, the Republic apparently considered this preferable to the dangers presented by a possible renewal of Dutch operations.

PROBLEMS OF REPUBLIC. The truce can be understood only in terms of its background. When the Dutch attacked on July 21, 1947, the Indonesian Republic was the recognized *de facto* authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura, according to the Linggadjati agreement, which went into effect in March 1947. Linggadjati also provided for the formation of a United States of Indonesia (a sovereign democratic, federal state, including the Republic) and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union (a joint organization of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands).

As a result of their attack, the Dutch were able to alter greatly the balance of forces in Indonesia. The Republic was reduced to areas in West and Central Java plus most of Sumatra, and its population was cut from an estimated 57,000,000 to some 20,000,000. Madura, the richest portions of Java, and certain developed sections of Sumatra passed into Dutch hands. The nationalist government at Jogjakarta, while retaining control of valuable resources, found itself based on parts of Java that formed a food deficit area. Although the Republic carried on some foreign trade through the Dutch blockade, it was not able to supply its needs.

When the Indonesian issue came before the Security Council, the Republic drew support only from a

Why did the UN General Assembly decide on partition? What motives inspired the policy of the United States? How can the UN decision be implemented?
READ

PARTITION OF PALESTINE

by Thomas J. Hamilton

25 cents

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minority of the members, with the U.S.S.R. and Australia giving it the strongest verbal backing. The colonial powers—Britain, France and Belgium—supported the Netherlands. The United States, which held the balance of power, committed itself openly to neither side, but leaned in fact much more toward the Netherlands than toward the Republic. As a result of this situation, it soon became clear that the UN was not likely to put teeth into its decisions on the Indonesian situation, although it had taken the first step of issuing a cease-fire order.

TERMS OF THE TRUCE. The Security Council's Committee of Good Offices consisted of an Australian (Justice Richard C. Kirby), a Belgian (Mr. Paul van Zeeland) and an American (Dr. Frank P. Graham, president of the University of North Carolina). Under the truce which crowned its efforts, the Dutch and the Republicans were to cease fire on the basis of a boundary line proclaimed by the Dutch on August 29, 1947. The border zones were to be demilitarized, and the troops of each side removed from the territory of the other (a reference, in effect, to Indonesian troops in the Dutch rear).

Politically the January 17 terms, and others signed soon afterward, followed some of the Linggadjati clauses by providing for the establishment of a United States of Indonesia and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. But the Dutch may assign powers to a provisional federal government of Indonesia preceding the formation of the United States of Indonesia. The declaration follows that all Indonesian states (i.e., including the Republic) are to be offered "fair representation" in such a provisional government. Within six months to a year plebiscites are to be

held in Java, Sumatra and Madura to determine whether the people wish to be under the Republic or some other government. The two signatories may, however, agree on another method of determining the will of the people.

WILL THE TRUCE WORK? When the Renville terms were first announced, they were widely acclaimed as a victory for the UN. This was perhaps true in the sense that an immediate resumption of warfare was avoided. The ultimate outcome, however, remains uncertain, despite the statement that "colonialism is dead," made by Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands in a radio broadcast to the United States and Britain on February 3. For if the Linggadjati terms did not work, it would be unwise to assume in advance that another agreement, recognizing the fruits of the failure of that pact, will be more effective.

Much will depend on the policies of the Dutch and the Republicans. One important question is whether the Dutch will continue the process—already successful in some measure—of encouraging regional tendencies in Indonesia with the effect of reducing the Republic's influence. The policy of the United States will also be crucial, especially since the Dutch, both at home and in Indonesia, are hoping for American aid in economic rehabilitation and expansion. As of the present moment, the Renville truce may be either the beginning of a real improvement in Dutch-Republican relations or simply another phase in the political and military struggle which has been going on in Indonesia since the defeat of Japan.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

POLITICAL CLASHES HARASS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

The present governments of Latin America are having difficulty in living up to the standards of able, public-spirited administration demanded of them in the first optimistic months after the war. Almost without exception these governments are of post-war origin, and at that time articulated the electorate's desire for more progressive policies. Inexperienced or rusty in the techniques of public administration, the new governments were faced not only with the familiar problems of underdeveloped countries, but also with post-war inflation and dislocation of trade. In the interval, political leadership has divided on the question whether genuine efforts should be made to meet these problems, and if so, how, and at what pace. These differences have given rise to the factional strife, repression, revolutionary alarms, and even resort to one-man rule that today obscure the political picture in Latin America.

FACTIONAL STRIFE IN COLOMBIA. Colombia's troubles can be immediately traced to the upset in that country's two-party system in 1946.

Previously it had very nearly been the case that every Colombian "born into this world alive was either a little Liberal, or else a little Conservative." In the 1946 presidential elections, however, a radical faction within the Liberal party broke away to campaign for its leader, Jorge E. Gaitán. Although the *gaitanistas* showed surprising strength, the Liberal vote was split, and for the first time since 1930 a conservative government came to power. Last year the Liberals, reunited under Gaitán, won the Congressional elections, and President Mariano Ospina thereupon offered to give the country a bipartisan government. Cabinet posts were divided between the two parties; but provincial and municipal government offices went to Conservatives, and in the lower echelons observance of the conciliatory policy was perfunctory. The political situation gradually became more tense until, in mid-January, fighting broke out between Conservatives and Liberals in the northwestern province of Santander del Norte. At least 23 casualties resulted, many properties were

fired, and hundreds of people were driven from their homes—some fleeing across the Venezuelan border to safety. On January 20 the government imposed a state of siege in the area. Disorder, meanwhile, threatened to spread to other parts of the country, already harassed by strikers in the oil industry.

On January 29 the Liberal party presented a memorandum of its grievances to President Ospina. This soberly worded document stated that Ospina's "National Union" had been betrayed by his subordinates, described the "forced exodus" of Liberal sympathizers from the northern provinces as an arbitrary redistricting of the area; accused the government of "discreet yet efficient persecution" of workers' organizations and of inaction in the face of rising costs and ever more acute shortages. The recent outbreaks seem to be a throwback to the bitter struggle for control of the provinces in the federal period of the last century. But what is fundamentally more serious is the longstanding division between the moderates and the radicals in the Liberal party itself. Their common opposition to the Conservative government has temporarily cemented relations between the two factions. Yet if the Liberals believe, as they stated in the January 29 memorandum, that "one of the best fruits of the prolonged struggle of Colombians to reach political maturity was the elimination of strife and deep-going differences between the various parties," the statement equally applies to them.

ANTI-COMMUNISM IN BRAZIL AND CHILE. In Brazil and Chile, on the other hand, government policy on the Communist issue has had the effect of momentarily uniting the parties of the center and right. The problem confronting citizens of these countries is that of reconciling with the democratic conscience the harsh repressive measures initiated by their administrations against the Communist movement. The Brazilian Congress on January 7 followed up earlier action outlawing the Communist party by depriving Communists in elective offices of their mandates. This measure affected the lone Senator, party head Luiz Carlos Prestes, 13 Deputies, 18 Councilmen in Rio de Janeiro and numerous members of state legislatures. The leadership of the largest opposition party, the National Democratic Union, and of the old line Republican party have demonstrated solidarity with the government Social Democratic party by entering into a pact to cooperate with the administration in eliminating "the crises that are sapping the vitality of Brazil and threatening her future." The political truce concluded January 22 will meet its first severe test when

offices taken from the Communists are distributed.

In Chile, on January 15 moderate and conservative parties, almost without demur, gave President González an extension of the emergency powers granted last August. The leadership of the Radical, Democratic and Socialist parties, in fact, initiated inquiries into the action of Congressmen in their membership who voted against the Special Powers Act. It is evident, however, that there is some disagreement among these centrist and left-wing parties upon the extent to which they would ally themselves with the Right in a united anti-Communist front. In this period of confusion, opinion in Chile and throughout Latin America has been embarrassed by the case of Pablo Neruda, Communist Senator and a poet of considerable distinction. Neruda was stripped of his parliamentary immunity to undergo contempt proceedings on the ground that articles he had written for Venezuelan and Mexican publications were derogatory to Chile and its president.

The Neruda case is symbolic of the ideological dilemma posed for individuals of democratic conscience—a dilemma by no means confined to Latin America but which is more acute in that setting, where the alternatives are perhaps sharper. The other extreme was presented in Paraguay's presidential election of February 15, where the single candidate, Natalicio González, was overwhelmingly elected, and the outgoing president, Higinio Morinigo, is slated to become the new Minister of War. Many people among the politically conscious minority in Latin America are struggling with the question whether the alternative to complete freedom of political activity—with the prospect it raises of resultant anarchy—must inevitably be repressiveness degenerating into army rule. The new president of Venezuela, Rómulo Gallegos, a well-known novelist, offered an answer on the eve of his inauguration on February 15. Pointing out that the Communist party operates freely in that country, he said, "The best way to fight communism is to carry out the reforms which Democratic Action has pledged."

OLIVE HOLMES


Statesmen and Sea Power, by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. \$5.00

Traces the part taken by the statesman as contrasted to the professional sailor in the use of sea power from Elizabeth's reign.

Chronology of the Second World War. New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947. \$4.00

Covers important events from September 1938 to October 1945.

Washington News Letter



WILL U.S. REVISE PALESTINE POLICY?

The discussion of Palestine which the UN Security Council opened on February 16 has intensified a conflict that has been disturbing the Truman administration since the formulation of its Greek policy last March. Should we rely on our own actions or on international cooperation to achieve our aims in foreign policy? During the past week the National Security Council in Washington discussed the question whether the United States, by carrying out the program for the partition of Palestine which, at American instigation, the UN General Assembly accepted on November 29, would jeopardize the security of the United States by endangering our present policy of containing the Soviet Union. The President's own desire to encourage the UN to become an authoritative body has collided with the opinion of some of his advisers that our strategic interest in the Middle East demands we seek the friendship of the Moslem world, especially the Arabs. On February 16 it became known that the American government, in recent months, had addressed appeals to "certain interested" governments in the Middle East stressing the importance "of the exercise of restraint in dealing with the Palestine situation." Some of these appeals were made directly by President Truman—notably to Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, and to the Prince Regent of Iraq, Abdul Ilah.

PALESTINE AND SECURITY. Washington's review of American policy was occasioned by the report of the UN Palestine Commission on February 4 that the use of "military force in adequate strength" is needed to implement partition, and by the letter the Arab Higher Committee on Palestine sent on the same day to Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, declaring the Arabs would fight "to the last man" against "any force going to Palestine to partition the country." The UN Palestine Commission subsequently came to the conclusion that "a threat to peace" exists in the present Palestine disorders and requested the UN Security Council at Lake Success to consider this finding—which the Council undertook to do at the meeting called for February 16. By bringing the matter before the Council the Commission in effect confronted the United States directly with the problem whether it should vote to send troops—of this or some other country—to Palestine to enforce the decision of the UN against the will of the Arabs.

The argument made in the Administration for revision of Washington's Palestine policy turns on Russia. Those who favor revision predict that the Soviet Union might attempt to take part in super-

vising, or in providing manpower for, whatever force would be sent to Palestine in support of partition. Should this eventuality not arise, it is feared that the continuation of Arab attacks on Jews and whatever forces do police Palestine, might eventually foment disorder throughout the Middle East which Russia could exploit at many points. Thus Russia would hurdle the barrier which American diplomacy during the past two years has erected against the advance of Soviet influence below the northern frontiers of Iran, Turkey, and Greece, the key points of our Middle Eastern policy. By angering the Arabs, moreover, so the argument runs, we would endanger our foreign policy in other areas—for King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia might then be tempted to prevent American interests from developing their petroleum concessions in his country. According to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, the principal opponent of the partition policy in the Administration, this oil is necessary for the European Recovery Program and for the fueling of American military planes and naval vessels.

OBJECTIONS NOT NEW. These objections are not new. The Administration examined the same arguments last autumn and rejected them. At that time Secretary of State Marshall was not persuaded that Russia would obtain a military foothold in Palestine if some force were sent there, nor that Ibn Saud would deprive himself of his oil royalties by withdrawing the concession he had granted to American oil interests. Opponents of revision have asked whether the United States, in any case, is wise to rely for its security on oil 10,000 miles away. The desire to end disorders by appeasing the Arabs overlooks the facts that Palestine was disorderly before partition was voted, and that disappointed Jews as well as disappointed Arabs foment violence. Failure of the United States to support its own policy, it is contended, could seriously damage American prestige.

Although Marshall had not accepted Secretary Forrestal's opinions in advance of the UN Security Council meeting, the American embargo on exports of arms to Jews in Palestine has already worked to the advantage of the Arabs. Republicans have questioned this embargo, which is reminiscent of our 1936-39 policy toward Spain. On January 26 Presidential candidate Harold Stassen contended that the United States should support the establishment of a UN police force. These developments indicate that the Republican party will make a campaign issue of Palestine if Truman either repudiates partition or fails to encourage its implementation.

BLAIR BOLLES